Stability-Instability Paradox
The Stability-Instability Paradox is a concept in the realm of nuclear deterrence theory which suggests that the presence of nuclear weapons can stabilize the overall strategic relationship between nuclear-armed states. However, it can also encourage them to engage in lower-level conflicts, confident that a full-scale nuclear war is unlikely due to the deterrence effect. The strategic stability can induce low-level instability while low-level stability can induce strategic instability. This paradox has been particularly relevant in the context of two South Asian nuclear nations, Pakistan and India.
There are few elements of Stability-Instability Paradox which need to be analyzed for better understanding;
Strategic Stability: The possession of nuclear weapons creates a stable strategic and deterrence environment as both sides fear the mutual annihilation.
Instability at Lower Level: Although, nuclear weapons ensure the strategic stability, but it does not prevent lower-level conflicts (conventional level conflicts).
Limited Warfare: Nuclear weapon states may engage in lower-level conflicts like proxy wars, conventional and sub-conventional wars below the nuclear threshold.
Escalation Risks: Lower-level conflicts must be perceived well by the both sides. If they are misunderstood or mismanaged, they could lead to all-out nuclear war which would have catastrophic results.
Communication and Crisis Management: To reduce the risks associated with paradox, it is imperative to have clear and well-defined communication channels (US &USSR Hotline).
Nuclear Threshold Ambiguity: Nuclear weapon states may keep their nuclear threshold vague for deterrence, but such uncertainty can lead to low level conflicts for instance Balakot Air Strike.
Arms Race: To have the conventional or nuclear superiority over the adversary, states might enter an arms race which can lead to instability in future (Indian S-400 BMD System).
Nuclear Posture: Due to ambiguity or lack of clarity in the nuclear doctrine of a state, it can lead to increased instability.
Operation Brasstacks (1986) and the Kargil Conflict (1999) provide insightful examples to analyze how the Stability-Instability Paradox manifested itself in the post-nuclearization era of Pakistan and India.
Operation Brasstacks (1986)
Operation Brasstacks was an immense Indian military exercise which started in November 1986 and lasted till January 1987. This military exercise involved various divisions of infantry and air assault divisions, including 500,000 army personnel. The Indian Naval Forces formed a Special Marines Assault Group. It was deployed near to the Korangi Creek of Karachi Division in Pakistan.
According to India, it was an exercise to test the mechanization, mobility and air support technologies under the control of Indian Army. However, Pakistan saw this offensive power show by India as a potential threat which resembled the Hitler’s Blitzkrieg Strategy.
Stability-Instability Paradox
Operation Brasstacks was routine military exercise by India. It was aimed to test the readiness and ability of forces to mobilize while enhancing the conventional military capabilities of India. While keeping the Pak-India relations and history in view, Pakistan saw this enormous military movement as a potential threat, a potential threat pointing towards possible military engagement between two historic rivals. As a precaution, Pakistan mobilized its forces and strategic military deployments which was enough to flare up the regional instability.
This historic event clearly illustrates that the Indian attempt to improve its conventional military competency for own security and regional stability was misperceived by Pakistan as a potential threat directing towards a military conflict.
The Kargil War (1999)
The Kargil Conflict was a limited military engagement between Pakistan and India in 1999. This immense event took place in the Kargil District of Jammu and Kashmir when Pakistan infiltrated the Indian occupied territory of Kashmir to take control of strategic posts.
Stability-Instability Paradox
Pakistan and India entered in a full-scale conventional war under the nuclear threshold. Both parties to the conflict were nuclear weapon states. Nuclear deterrence was able to maintain the strategic stability as both sides knew the consequences of bringing nuclear weapons into play. Hence, the strategic stability remained intact.
Nuclear deterrence kept the strategic stability intact, but Pakistan and India did confront each other in a limited war. This limited military engagement caused devastating human loss. The international community especially the United States played a significant role by mediating to disarm the situation.
The Kargil War was a limited conflict that occurred in the shadow of nuclear deterrence. Pakistan attempted to change the status quo by occupying territory in Kargil without triggering a full-scale war, believing that a limited conflict was a viable option due to nuclear deterrence. This demonstrated the paradox in action, as Pakistan tested the boundaries of conventional conflict under the nuclear umbrella.
Arms Race Stability in South Asia
One of the pertinent components of strategic stability is arms race stability. Security of one state is insecurity of another. In the international anarchic world, power is manifested in advanced and sophisticated weaponry. South Asia is a complex region. Chinese military modernization intends to counter the US effect in the Asia-Pacific. Indian military modernization intends to counter Chinese dominance in the region. With a stagnant economy, Pakistan is trying to cope up with the Indian military modernization.
Pakistan relies heavily on its nuclear weapons for BOP. With the acquisition of S-400 BMD System by India, Pakistan developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs). Indian navy is undergoing a magnificent military modernization with integration of BrahMos Missile with INS Arihant. Furthermore, India strives to integrate emerging technologies with its land, air, and sea forces.
Pakistan’s economy does not allow it to acquire such sophisticated technology. Hence, Pakistan is taking small steps to somewhat counter the growing Indian military modernization. Few steps include introduction to SLCM Babur-III, acquisition of J-10C fighter jets, installation of Baktar-Shikan anti-tank guided missile system on MAAZ anti-tank vehicle etc.
Nuclear Modernization of South Asia
According to a report published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), international arms control framework like the NPT played a vital role in rapid nuclearization of South Asia. However, Pakistan and India are not signatories of the NPT. They acquire nuclear weapons in 1998 while enhancing their strategic footprint in the region.
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine evolved from “credible minimum deterrence” to “full spectrum deterrence”. FSD involves the mobilization of nuclear weapons in case of conventional war. Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) of Pakistan are evidence to the seriousness of FSD. TNWs include Hatf-IX (Nasr Missile) and SLCM Babur-III.
On the other hand, India is focused on developing reliable and flexible counterforce nuclear systems which includes precise and short ranged nuclear delivery systems and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRVs). Furthermore, India is modernizing its cruise and ballistic missiles like Pralay Missile. The motivation behind extensive modernization was to achieve the nuclear triad. Indian Navy’s INS Arihant is part of nuclear triad based on the strategies of UK, USA, Russia, and France to gain the sea supremacy.
Both nuclear rivals, Pakistan and India, are undergoing significant nuclear modernization. This nuclear modernization includes induction and integration of AI, autonomous weapons systems, and advanced missile technologies. Indian intent to investigate the space militarily remains unexplored. It requires a strong economic backbone and advance technology. India is still a periphery country which is climbing the ranks of global powers swiftly.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Stability-Instability Paradox highlights the precarious balance between deterrence and the inherent risks of nuclear bluff in Pakistan and India’s post-nuclearization age. Operation Brasstacks and Kargil War are not the only instances in the history of these South Asian nations where the application of Stability-Instability Paradox can be examined. The Balakot Air Strike and its response serve as the witness of devastating effects of nuclear weapons and nuclear threshold. Minor miscalculation in terms of Pakistani response could have led to all-out nuclear war while undermining the strategic stability.
Although the acquisition of nuclear weapons has helped to avert major conflicts, it has also added to the complexity and instability of the situation by escalating underlying tensions. To secure long-term regional peace and security, addressing these issues calls for a multimodal strategy that incorporates active conflict resolution, diplomatic engagement, and strategic deterrence.
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