Russian Psy-ops in Crimea | Explainer | Security Lense | 01-Sep-2024
Introduction:
In early 2014 pro-Russian protesters became increasingly assertive in Crimea; groups wearing uniforms that can’t be identified surrounded airports in Simferopol and Sevastopol. There were also masked gunmen that surrounded the Crimean parliament and also raised the Russian flag along with that the pro-Russian lawmakers dismissed the sitting government and installed a new pro-Russian prime minister Sergey Aksyonov. After installation of Prime Minister, Russian troops then moved into Crimea claiming for the protection of its citizens along with the military assets in the region. On March 6, there was a voting conducted in the Crimean parliament to join the Russian Federation and to leave Ukraine with public referendum. With the overwhelming result of 97% in favor of joining Russia, the Russian Federation then formally annexed Crimea by signing a treaty on March 18 2014.This incident marked the beginning of conflict between both the nations.
By a layman perspective all of this was done solely by the use of force in form of gunman taking control of Crimean parliament but many more events were taking place simultaneously. The focus was on the civilian population and changing their perspective or narrative which they did and this helped Russian a lot in the annexation of Crimea because there was no internal retaliation from the population and not even a single bullet was fired in the process. As the new information environment has changed the nature of warfare, now battles can take place in cyber and communication domain rather than the traditional battlefield i.e., on land, air and sea.
The role of traditional conventional forces was minimal in the Crimean crisis as it was particularly a bold example of an influence operation. With the advancement in technologies Cyber attacks have become a prevalent threat in the modern society with the adversaries targeting crucial computerized system that underpin our daily lives, businesses and infrastructures and it extends beyond physical disruption where adversaries can use cyber domain to launch ‘soft’ attacks, giving out manipulative information with the intent of shaping perceptions and decision making. Cyberspace is frequently used in conflicts to interfere with the communication networks of the opposition. But the Crimean crisis has shown us another way to use internet, one that focuses on narrative-driven operations that go straight to the minds of individuals.
Role of social media in Crimean Crisis:
It is important to first unveil the structure of Russian information campaigns particularly the nexus between narratives used and the number of platforms that can be effectively targeted within the society. Russian information warfare can be understood as a system of cascading narratives, along with the intensity of influence operations and the number of platforms suitable for exploitation. The target audience in case of Crimea was the Russian speaking population which was in majority and a sense of threat was created against the Ukrainian government and their alleged persecution and brutality towards the Russian speaking population.These narratives were propagated using different social media platforms (Instagram, face book, YouTube and twitter) and other forms of communication channels.
Global social media usage is still on the increase; according to Facebook, there are 1.6 billion active users—more users than there are nations on the earth. This group makes up about half of all Internet users and offers a platform for the simple propagation of fake and accurate information to large audiences. The typical Facebook user has 330 friends. If the user hasn’t selected privacy settings, then their posts can directly reach 330 people, and from each of those 330 people, 330 more, and so on, spreading the word like a virus. The Russian government paid 600 individuals over $19 million to write blogs, post comments on news items, and use social media continuously during its occupation of Crimea in 2014. Their goals were to influence public and global opinion, silence the voices of opponents on the internet, and present the annexation’s supporters as the majority of the people.
Social media hackers used misinformation and fear to appeal to Crimea’s pro-Russian population in order to achieve this. One such rumor claimed that three-year-old kid had been crucified by Ukrainian military in Slovyansk’s main square, however independent sources swiftly rejected this account as false. As word of this story circulated throughout the general population, many began to accept it even though it was false. This narrative was taken as truth by annexation advocates because it satisfied their biases against the Ukrainian military stationed there. Similar articles were published by pro-Russian cyber attackers in an effort to further divide the Crimean people.
An instance of this included the account of a supposed emergency physician at the center of the tensions in Odessa in May 2014, Igor Rosovsky, who claimed that Crimean nationalists were attacked by Ukrainian supporters and burnt alive. “Igor” was stopped by the Ukrainian fighters who insulted and called him names as he tried to assist the nationalists. As word of this story circulated throughout the general population, many began to accept it even though it was false. Russian social media platforms like Vkontakte saw a quick spread of this Facebook post; within 24 hours, people shared the story 5,000 times. Once more, this narrative was proven false by Western analysts, much like the child’s crucifixion in Slovyansk. Even when these kinds of reports are false, social media platforms make it possible for a message to reach millions of people more quickly than in the past.
On these sites, there are two to seventy interactions for every post for every 1,000 users. This platform is one of the quickest methods for anyone trying to create a narrative for spreading misinformation and create hatred or terror against their opponents. Social media hacking groups, like the ones behind Russia’s takeover of Crimea, target groups who have previously shown support for their cause and stoke that flame to motivate people to act. Throughout the conflict, this call served to strengthen the Russian strategic narrative. The state used breaking news, blogs from alleged eyewitnesses, viral videos, and storytelling to use conventional and social media to reach the region’s youngsters who support nationalism as well as elderly citizens. This illusion spread as society became more divided, and Russian “troll farms” hired workers to produce hundreds of pro-Russian social media messages each day.
The opinions of the general population in the region played a major role in the success of the Russian social cyberattack in Crimea. The Russian community rejected Kiev’s administration as being legitimate. While the majority of Ukrainians outside the Crimea region (66.4%) disapprove of Russia’s involvement, an overwhelming majority of Crimeans (71.3%) said that the annexation had a favorable effect on the region. Attackers were able to discredit opponents of the Russian acquisition and propagate the narrative among those who agreed with their position by taking advantage of a willing target audience.
The Russian cyberattacks scope greatly exceeded social media platforms in order to help shape the regional geopolitical narrative. An information blackout was caused in the region by distributed denial of service attacks against websites and news outlets run by the Ukrainian government, communications jamming against the Ukrainian navy, and Internet Protocol-based phone strikes against the phones of Ukrainian government officials. Like in any other area of conflict, pro-annexation players in the area swiftly established and maintained information dominance during this blackout, controlling the narrative of the area with minimal help from outside influences.
Three things contributed to Russian interests’ victory in Crimea. Initially, Russian special forces and cybercriminals shut down communications in the area, isolating them from the outside world. Second, the intended outcome of polarizing the local populace was accomplished through the use of troll farms and social media cyberattacks to target a specific audience inside the region. Finally, there was little direct involvement of conventional Russian forces in the annexation due to the extreme polarization of the general population and the lack of outside communication.
Conclusion:
Russia demonstrated to the rest of the world the effectiveness of social media as a weapon. It was able to overthrow a sovereign nation without the use of large-scale conventional forces by turning its citizens against one another. Future battles will involve civilian populations that are just as connected—if not more so—than those in Crimea, and social media use will be crucial in determining how the public perceives information.
Social media has the power to influence the course of a war and win a difficult engagement, as the Russian government demonstrated through strategic timing, message, and demographic targeting. Particularly through social media, it spreads like wildfire among groups that are connected, and as the story naturally develops, rumors or incomplete truths will surface. All those hostile actors need to do in such an environment is accelerate its development to their advantage. Russia is influencing people’s thoughts and perceptions using a variety of strategies and tools.
Hence, it was the first time the world witnessed how social media can also be used as a weapon by changing the perspective of the people and making them fight against each other in the Crimean war. The Russian federation hired more than a thousand freelancers and also firms for making and propagating this false news which turned out to be a success and the Russian government succeeded in achieving its goal which was the annexation of Crimea without firing a single bullet and this was achieved through the propaganda which divided the people into two i.e., the pro Russians and pro Ukrainians.
Hence, a new domain or a new battle ground emerged where in contemporary time every country in the world is trying its best to actively get involved and used to it as it will be the future of warfare. There will be less face to face interactions or use of force by countries and everyone will be more into information and cyberwarfare using different media and social media platforms as tools of warfare.
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