![The Long Game](https://i0.wp.com/securitylense.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/images-5.webp?resize=190%2C265&ssl=1)
The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India | Book Review | Security Lense |27-Dec-2024
Vijay Gokhale is a leading Indian diplomat and former foreign minister of India who has a lot of experience with China. Gokhale was the Indian ambassador to China and has worked at the China desk for 25 years, so he should know Chinese diplomacy better. His book titled The Long Game, in which he unpacks China’s negotiating strategies in dealing with India was published in 2021. Using historical background and personal stories, Gokhale breaks down what he believes to be China’s strategic negotiating style and the cultural, historical, and political factors that shape China’s behavior.
Part I provides an introduction and historical context to Sino-Indian relations, going back to the mid-twentieth century.
Gokhale explains how this interaction took place during India’s struggle for independence and the rise of Maoist China. He goes further by dissecting the fundamental characteristics of China through historical events such as the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954. These circumstances form the backdrop for interpreting the overall trends in Sino-Indian diplomacy.
Gokhale goes one step further and points out that Chinese negotiators are known for being disciplined, taking their cue from Confucius and Sun Tzu, and not rushing into anything. For the Chinese, timing is everything, and the long game also describes how Chinese negotiations can take years to reach the desired outcome. He says that the Chinese are masters at confusing and tiring their opponents so that they are forced to accept a deal favorable to the Chinese. This is a marked difference from India’s clearer and more time-conscious diplomatic culture.
Another striking trend that runs throughout the book is the Chinese ability to exude asymmetry, which applies equally to power relations, information management and manipulation, and perception. Even in the cases that Gokhale also lists, where Chinese negotiators maintained information power or information asymmetry, influence was used selectively. In this way, they often put India on the defensive in strategic interactions or on certain issues, arenas, or conflicts. This asymmetry, according to Gokhale, was one reason why China was able to conduct negotiations in its favor.
The author goes into detail on the parts of the Sino-Indian negotiations on which he focuses, including the 1962 border war and the subsequent negotiations on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Above all, Gokhale shows how the Chinese exploited India’s domestic political and strategic weakness. For example, he describes how the Chinese used the ambiguity over the LAC to their advantage by leaving plenty of room for maneuvering over their line of claim. Such episodes testify to their general approach of building incremental successes on the basis of haze as a kind of fog of war.
Gokhale goes on to discuss the economic aspects of negotiations between China and India, particularly in the liberalized post-1991 environment, pointing out that while India sought to expand trade with the Chinese, the latter always maintained a mercantilist economy based on reciprocity. Thus, they prioritized industry and technology, ensuring that economic agreements were in favor of the Chinese. Gokhale notes that China’s economic aggression continues to mask its long-term strategic interest and its means of securing strategic assets.
Another important feature of the book is that the author shows in detail how China uses multilateral forums to achieve its bilateral goals. Gokhale does this by taking a closer look at India’s experience with projects in bodies such as the BRICS, the SCO, and the United Nations. He describes how China has often used the forum to dilute India’s influence while appearing to be a good teammate. This influence, according to Gokhale, is a clear indication of China’s secondary approach, which emphasizes both partnership and rivalry.
The long game also reveals the cultural aspects that determine the negotiating strategies of the two countries. As Gokhale has already noted, Indian negotiating teams are proud of their principles and moral standpoints, while the Chinese are more realistic and conclusion oriented. He further asserts that such a cultural divide has consistently put India on the wrong side of the negotiation, as the Chinese have mastered the art of emotional blackmail and symbolic politics.
![The Long Game](https://i0.wp.com/securitylense.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/pexels-lara-jameson-8828681.webp?resize=1024%2C683&ssl=1)
In the concluding chapters of Gokhale’s book, I found the following important lessons for Indian negotiators in dealing with China:
The author argues against this and calls for a more strategic approach that requires more preparation, patience, and consistency. He also pays close attention to aspects of the Chinese historical and cultural mindset that are central to assessing their actions and responding successfully to them. Gokhale says that India itself should develop a long-term game plan to counter China’s emerging dominance in the region.
The Long Game is thus a dissection of China’s cunning strategy and an appeal to policymakers and diplomats in India. These theses are backed by first-hand experience and a comprehensive understanding of Chinese diplomacy, making the book very useful for anyone seeking to understand India-China relations. Overall, it provides a clear prescription for preparation, patience, and calculation to contain the threat from China. At the same time, it provides an optimistic guide for the next engagements in the future, including nuanced caveats.
The Long Game is indeed an instructive read for India to better understand China’s diplomatic aspirations and related policies. Although Vijay Gokhale’s background knowledge and first-hand experience with China adds color to the perception of China’s negotiating strategies, the book mainly represents an Indian perspective that sometimes lacks a global analysis of Chinese diplomacy.
Therefore, critics might accuse the book of downplaying India’s own failures in countering China’s actions or structural constraints on India. However, the author of the book does a good job of integrating the concepts of culture and strategy, especially in international negotiations. Policymakers in India would do well to study Gokhale’s work, as it is both a cautionary fable and a roadmap for developing a much more nuanced strategy to counter a wily neighbor.
Author: Vijay Keshav Gokhale
Pages: 200
Connect with Security Lense
Leave a Reply