Emergence of ISKP | Research Paper | Security Lense | 26-March-2024
Pakistan has a long history of fighting insurgent groups; for decades, Pakistan has been facing terrorism. However, in recent times, there has emerged a new group that challenges the state writ and wants to establish a transnational caliphate. The group is an affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and has its regional name, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP). Disgruntled fighters from TTP and other terror groups formed the group, which has since diversified its fighter force. They follow strict Salafi Takfirism and consider the Taliban apostates because they abandoned the jihad and negotiated with the United States. In Pakistan, the group has carried out deadly attacks, killing hundreds. According to some sources, ISKP has hideouts in Bajaur and Mastung.[1]
They are currently running sleeper cells. The Taliban claim the group leader has fled to Pakistan after suffering injuries. The group’s attacks are also less frequent because of the TTP resurgence. However, ISKP is different from TTP; it has global ambitions, and its propaganda is effective in recruiting educated individuals. It uses sophisticated technology and receives funding from Europe and around the world. The group on 22 March 2024 conducted an attack in Russia, and they claim they will conduct similar attacks in the future.[2] In Pakistan, the state does not face an immediate threat from ISKP, unlike TTP, but ISKP has the potential to become a lethal group, as they claim to be in the process of restructuring and reorganizing phase.
Introduction
In recent times, Pakistan has been facing a resurgence of attacks from various terror groups, all of whom are from different ideological and ethnic backgrounds. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) is one such group that has carried out multiple attacks in Pakistan, a few of which turned out deadly. ISKP claimed to have carried out its first attack in Pakistan at the Hospital in the Capital City of Balochistan Province, and as the years progressed, the group launched more attacks. The following years saw political turmoil in Pakistan, compounded by a worsening economic situation. Pakistan has recently faced an increase in terror attacks from three groups, namely the TTP, ISKP, and BLA.[3] The ISKP, stationed in Afghanistan at the time, declared the Afghan Taliban government un-Islamic and initiated a jihad against them. The Kabul Airport attack during the US withdrawal from Afghanistan was the deadliest one, killing 170 Afghans and 13 US service members.[4]
The Afghan Taliban, after starting a brutal assault against the group, claimed they had reduced the group’s activity and were no longer active in Afghanistan. The Taliban official contended that al-Muhajir had escaped to the remote, lawless Balochistan territories. Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs ministry has not refuted the Afghan Taliban claim. The Afghan government and Pakistan are blaming each other for harboring the terror group. ISKP recently carried out an attack on a concert in Crocus City Hall in Russia that killed 137 people. This has strained the relationship between Afghanistan and Russia, as Afghanistan has condemned the attack.[5] The world is once again questioning Afghanistan’s commitment to preventing safe havens for terror groups. The ISKP has become global; they are carrying out attacks not just in the adjacent regions but all the way to Russia. A recent report from the United States Institute of Peace has underlined that ISKP is a potential threat and is expanding its operations.[6] In Pakistan, however, the group is considered a secondary threat right now. Pakistan considers TTP a significant threat to Pakistan’s peace and stability.
Pakistan faced the brunt of attacks from the ISKP. In 2018, the country reported the highest fatalities caused by the group’s suicide bombings, killing more than 200 people. However, in the following years, the number of deaths started to decrease. In 2022–23, the ISKP’s suicide attacks caused nearly 60 deaths. Despite the decrease in fatalities, the terror group continued its operations in Pakistan, reporting and accepting 50 attacks. The Afghan Taliban’s counterinsurgency was the primary reason why, in the years that followed, the number of attacks by the ISKP in Pakistan decreased. The group currently does not have any significant territories in Afghanistan or Pakistan; they are currently running their sleeper cells underground.[7] They are in the re-organizing and restructuring phase, running covert operations. Right now, they do not pose a serious threat to Pakistan’s security.
It is critical to theoretically analyze every research study. While terrorism is a contested term, applying a theoretical framework to any terror group is difficult. Many scholars have tried to apply theories from different disciplines. Rational choice theory is used for this research.[8] Although, the rational choice theory was developed by Adam Smith in Economics, this theory found its application in other discipline. Derek Cornish and Ronald Clarke introduced the Rational Choice Theory in Criminology, they published a book in 1983 titled “The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending”.[9] Rational Choice Theory is a useful way to understand terrorist behavior because terrorism usually requires careful planning. This suggests that the people who commit terrorism are rational individuals who carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of their choices. The distinctions between terrorism and crime are not very significant because both are influenced by the combination of motivation and opportunity. Hence, it is not appropriate to interpret the ISKP’s actions as typical fanatical terror attacks.
The ISKP comprises educated individuals, unlike the TTP, which primarily recruits its members from madrassahs. The Rational Choice Theory is employed to assess the actions of ISKP. According to the rational choice theory, criminal activity is intentional and well-thought-out. Simultaneously, it is important to recognize that all criminals are rational individuals who make deliberate choices to optimize the benefits of their present situation.[10] According to this theory, terror groups tend to plan their actions carefully, and even when they are not, they still have a logical reason behind them.
Origin and Structure
The term “Islamic State” refers to a radical extremist group that emerged and seeks to establish a caliphate based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law. ISKP is a localized branch of the Islamic State. The Khorasan is a geographical area that includes portions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, and Iran and has historical significance. It is referred to as wilayah, which is the equivalent of province in English.[11] After the defeat of the ISIS Caliphate in 2019 in Syria, what remains of Islamic State has gone chiefly underground in the region of Syria and Iraq.
ISKP currently poses one of the most pressing transnational security threats. In 2012, the civil war in Syria happened, and the Al-Qaeda (AQ) branches in Afghanistan and Pakistan started lobbying for volunteers to fight in Syria; al-Qaeda wanted to market it as their global jihad for their donors or, perhaps in the long term, expand in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These fighters joined the Al Nusra ranks, which later on became ISIS. According to one of the ISKP leaders, the first contingent of volunteers was sent under the leadership of Hafiz Saeed on 14 July 2012.[12] He was at that time part of TTP, and these included 143 Afghan and Pakistani fighters. The following year, the Syrian authorities revealed the deaths of 11 Afghan fighters, and the number of fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan increased.
According to the source in ISIL, by June 2014, there were already 575 Afghans and 714 Pakistanis in its ranks in Syria and Iraq. Hafiz Saeed was not the only person who was in contact and cooperating with Al Qaeda; Miran Shah Shura (Haqqani network) and Peshawar Shura were also in contact with Al Qaeda. One story goes like this: in April 2013, while still affiliated with AQ, Al-Baghdadi phoned Serajuddin Haqqani and asked him to dispatch a party of volunteers to Syria.[13] The source claims that Serajuddin promised to deploy 400 fighters in return for $12 million to the Miran Shah Shura’s coffers, plus an additional $20 million for the contingent’s salaries, equipment, and maintenance.
Haqqanis, with a large reserve of fighters, could easily sacrifice 400 of its fighters in Syria. These were generous offers. AQ offered $800/month to fighters, four times the amount they got under the Taliban.[14] Ten commanders from the TTP and Taliban, who were leading the first group to Syria, were allegedly promised positions by the Military Commission of IS-I so that they may spread their radical ideology among other extremist organizations in Pakistan. Members of the Afghan Taliban, TTP, IMU, Lashkar-e Taiba, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, and others began to be approached beginning in November 2013. Some of these ten commanders went on to become prominent characters within IS-K; for example, Sa’ad Emarati became Amir of Logar, and Sheikh Mohsin became Amir of Kunar.
The Haqqanis allegedly established a training camp in Waziristan, while the Peshawar Shura did the same in Kunar, with the goal of teaching the locals Arabic grammar and vocabulary. It was from these fighters who later on returned and made the ISKP. These fighters have fought in Syria and Iraq and became an asset of ISIS when they declared khilafat. They were sent on a mission to establish the group in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, and Iran. In January 2015, the ISKP officially came into existence. Hafiz Saeed assumed leadership of the group, proclaiming themselves as a wilayat (province) of ISIS Central in Khurasan.[15] The structure of the group is intricate, comprising mainly of dissatisfied fighters from TTP. Additionally, they have managed to recruit fighters from other organizations, including Lashkar e Taiba, Jundullah, Islamic Movement Uzbekistan (IMU), and Jamat al Ahrar. Some of the groups do act independently but still consider themselves affiliates of the ISKP. This is a complex web of different terror groups. The question of why it proliferated in Afghanistan and Pakistan is because of the presence of various militant groups that, with time, saw their groups fight as nationalist fights rather than Jihad. The ISKP, on the contrary, provided this new global Jihad and was way more radical than the groups that already existed.
The current emir of ISKP is Shahab al-Muhajir, and the organization follows a strict hierarchical structure. The top leadership of the ISKP is comprised of a Shura Advisory Council, province commanders, and heads of the bureaucratic branches responsible for intelligence and logistics, among others.[16] While the initial members of ISKP primarily consisted of commanders from the TTP, the leadership of the group has since become more varied. Al-Muhajir, believed to be of Arab descent, is the first leader of ISKP to originate from outside the region. Research conducted in 2016 revealed that the majority of middle-level officers in ISKP had previously been fighters with the Taliban.[17]
Newer investigations into the group’s leadership have uncovered even more diverse backgrounds, including members with ties to al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent and Lashkar-e-Taiba. The tactical effectiveness of these fighters is enhanced by their extensive local knowledge and competence in guerrilla warfare.
The effectiveness of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP) in recruiting new members can be attributed to various factors, such as exploiting the anxieties of other jihadist groups, offering financial incentives, and promoting the triumphs of the Islamic State’s core faction in Iraq and Syria on the battlefield. Although there are some foreign militants in the ranks of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP), this recruitment has been described as more of a “trickle” than a windfall. Furthermore, the collapse of the territorial caliphate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria did not result in a significant influx of Islamic State soldiers to Afghanistan. For its continued operation, ISKP is dependent on a variety of sources of revenue. ISKP is estimated to have received funding from the central leadership of the Islamic State, as well as through local donations and extortion, according to estimations provided by the United States Department of the Treasury.[18] Furthermore, the Treasury discovered that as of the year 2020, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP) had a limited amount of cash on hand and relied significantly on a vast network of hawala, which are informal money brokers, in locations such as Jalalabad and Kabul to transfer money. [19]
Relationship between ISIS Central and ISKP
In order to understand the structure of financial support of ISKP its relation with ISIS Central is important to examine. As it inherited the model from ISIS Central and lately developed its own Indigenous network, and some of the support is from the old ISIS funders, the network that existed for ISIS now works for ISKP.[20] ISIS played an important part in increasing the operational capability of the Islamic State of Khorasan and strengthening it, including its financial network.
In order to fully grasp the financial support and operational dynamics of the organization, it is crucial to have a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the Islamic State-Central. It is possible for the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP) to continue its operations because it has a complex financial system that is dependent on a variety of sources. These sources include financial support from the wider ISIS network, in particular from the leadership of ISIS Central. ISIS Central played a crucial role in strengthening the operational capabilities of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP), which is illustrated by the fact that this internal coordination offers a consistent supply of cash. This demonstrates the interconnected nature of numerous ISIS factions. Furthermore, to enhance its financial capabilities, the ISKP partakes in unlawful activities such as human trafficking and smuggling, solicits funds from individuals who share its ideology, and implements a local taxation system in areas under its authority.[21] These efforts are undertaken with the aim of enhancing its financial resources. ISKP has consistently spoken with the leadership of ISIS Central from its inception, establishing a connection that goes beyond providing financial assistance to include operational independence and decision-making authority.
Strategic Goals and Objectives
The group is different from other terror groups, especially Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) because it advocates for different ideologies under different schools of thought. It accuses the Taliban of being filthy nationalists, has condemned their talks with the United States, and has declared them apostates as they have abandoned Holy Jihad. They consider the Taliban a deviant Deobandi and have condemned organizations like Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and JuI-F. ISKP’s ultimate goal in Pakistan is to overthrow the government, implement Shariah law, and establish a transnational caliphate. Its agenda is international; it targets non-Suni Muslims and Sikh Christians in Pakistan. The global ambitions of the ISKP might not be realistic as of now, but this is the only thing that makes them different. Al Muhajir recently wrote a book in Pashto about the Islamic political system.[22] Showing how seriously they take their goal and mission. According to ISKP, they are currently in the reorganization and restructuring phase; they are spreading their propaganda and trying to attract new recruits.
Media operations
Alongside its military activity and recruitment attempts, the Islamic State has significantly prioritized its propaganda output in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Following the Taliban takeover in August 2021, ISKP merged its propaganda and media activities under the main media arm of the organization, al-Azaim Media Foundation. In the September 2022 annual report, Al Azaim disclosed that the group had released a total of 175 publications, including translations of existing works, and had created 750 audio and 108 video outputs in the preceding 12 months.[23]
Along with its four periodicals, ISKP expanded its publication portfolio in 2022 with the launch of Voice of Khurasan, an English-language periodical that targets Islamic State sympathizers in South Asia outside of Afghanistan.[24]
The magazine was also translated into Pashto, Persian, and Arabic. An increasing number of these periodicals have been instrumental in the recruitment and mobilization of militant organizations in the region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. ISPP, on the other hand, is a sub-group of ISKP and does not appear to have any local media branch in Pakistan, nor does it appear to generate any audiovisual or textual materials of its own, producing any of its own. Instead, the Diwan al-ilam, which is the primary media department of the Islamic State, is responsible for the dissemination of its movies in Arabic. The magazine Yalghar (Invasion) is the sole ISPP publication that deviates from this rule; since April 2021, three editions of the magazine have been made available for circulation.
Funding
When the ISIS-Central reserves diminished after their demise in Iraq and Syria, the ISKP adopted a regional hub-and-spoke structure that existed before.[25] Under this model, regional hubs take on more accountability for their own financial affairs and work together with other global hubs to combine resources; this gave the ISKP more autonomy in their financial matters[26]. ISKP uses digital technology to do transactions and receive funds through digital platforms. In a fundraiser ad, the ISKP was asking for funds in Monero cryptocurrency; Monero is famous for its security, and it’s hard to trace the transactions carried out through Monero. Nevertheless, the challenges involved in converting digital currency from online wallets into tangible money have limited the extent of these cryptocurrency transactions.
ISKP also relies on traditional sources of money, including extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and earnings from natural resources. However, currently, the group does not hold any territory as it had in Syria and Iraq, and even in Afghanistan before the Taliban counter-insurgency against them.[27] They depend mostly on secondary resources and donations. The hawala system, which is an informal network of brokers, is the mechanism that is utilized the most for the transfer of cash both within the country and internationally. The absence of regulation and the ease with which money may be exchanged anonymously, on the other hand, makes these networks susceptible to exploitation. ISKP also uses the system of hawala in order to transact financial transactions outside of Afghanistan and into neighboring countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates.
Impact on Security dynamics
With the spread of ISKP in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it has had a significant impact. It added another terror group in the region that can cause regional instability. In Bajaur, the ISKP attacked the JuI-F party convention, which resulted in the death of the Political leader of the Party; shows they have a presence and means to conduct such attacks, however after that attack was conducted, the number of attacks attributed to the group reduced, presented a significant danger to the security of the region. The establishment of the Islamic State of Khurasan (ISKP) has increased the issues Pakistan already faces, a sectarian issue which can significantly worsen the security situation in the area. With an increase in assaults in Pakistan since 2016, targeting regions such as Quetta, Baluchistan, and Sindh, the organization’s trajectory has changed throughout the years. Subsequently, the group expanded its footing in additional provinces.
Source: NO. 520 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org
The current expansion of the Islamic State of Khurasan (ISKP) is intended to draw militants from other groups, which might provide a challenge to policymakers in Islamabad and raise security worries in the whole country. Given the increasing number of terrorist attacks that have taken place in Pakistan and the efforts that the ISKP is making to bolster its presence by recruiting militants from other organizations, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the threat that the ISKP poses to Pakistan should not be underestimated.[28] Despite the fact that the actions of the organization are mostly concentrated on assaults on a smaller scale against security personnel, religious minorities, and polio vaccinators, they have the potential to escalate and destabilize the region. Alongside its activities in Afghanistan, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP) has established a foothold in Pakistan, which has brought to light the organization’s transnational and sectarian goals.[29] This agenda targets non-Sunni Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, and it even threatens Chinese interests throughout the area. Compared to the group’s operations in Afghanistan, the activities that it has been doing out in Pakistan have gotten less attention, yet recent strikes have demonstrated that they pose a significant threat to people within Pakistan.
A comprehensive response from policymakers is required in order to address the changing security dynamics in Pakistan as a result of the rise of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP) in Pakistan. This expansion has brought about a new dimension to the security landscape, which has posed challenges to the stability of the area, exacerbated existing conflicts, and necessitated a robust response.[30]
In recent years, the revival of TTP in Pakistan has also contributed to the fall of assaults by ISKP. One of the primary reasons for this is that in the past, the majority of the militants defected to join ISKP. However, now that TTP has strengthened its operations against Pakistan, the fighters are content to fight with TTP.[31] Therefore, the TTP did not end the discussions with Pakistan because they were afraid that their fighters might desert the ISKP. This is another reason why the talks were not concluded. As a result of this rise in terrorist assaults, the security picture in Pakistan has become much more precarious, with more regular terrorist strikes coming from the BLA, TTP, and ISKP parties.
In a suicide assault that took place in Besham on March 29, a vehicle detonated directly near the van that was transporting the Chinese engineers. The incident resulted in the deaths of five Chinese and one Pakistani. Up till this point, no organization has acknowledged the attack on the Chinese, but Pakistani officials have pointed the finger of guilt at Afghanistan for the incident. On the other hand, some observers believe that the incident may have been carried out by the ISKP, given that the group previously held a hostile attitude toward the Chinese. An attack carried out by the ISKP on a concert held in Russian Crocus City on March 24 resulted in the deaths of over 130 individuals and sent shock waves across the whole world. Due to the fact that Russia is providing backing to the Assad government, the strike that was carried out by ISKP demonstrates their outreach and how they are able to carry out attacks of this nature. ISIS views Russia as an adversary, and the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP), which is an affiliate of ISIS, in addition, threatened the Russians with strikes within Russia. ISKP’s profile has been elevated as a consequence of this incident, and it has been brought back into the spotlight in the press throughout the world. This will eventually lead to a rise in the number of people who join the organization and the amount of money it receives.
Due to the fact that it has not yet proved any significant danger to Pakistan’s security, its strategic ambitions are now outside of the realm of possibility. It is believed that the operation that the Afghan Taliban carried out against the ISKP is the cause of the decrease in the number of assaults that have been carried out by the group. During the year 2023, the organizations demonstrated how successful the Taliban counter-insurgency effort was by nearly completely putting an end to the attacks that were taking place in Afghanistan.[32] Between April and May of 2023, they could not carry out a single attack, and between June and September of that same year, they could only carry out two or three attacks.
Now, its strategic objectives are unattainable because they have not presented any significant danger to Pakistan’s national security whatsoever. The Afghan Taliban offensive against ISKP is responsible for this decline in attacks, because they are being routed from there strongholds in Afghanistan. In 2023, ISKP failed to conduct any significant attack in Afghanistan, which shows how successful the Taliban counter-insurgency strategy was. Between April and May of 2023, they could not carry out a single attack, and between June and September of that same year, they could only carry out two or three attacks.
Countering the threat
Pakistan has been facing economic woes for the past few years, and the situation is only getting worse.[33] Along with that, Pakistan has many places that are neglected, and people are underprivileged. If we analyze, most of the terror groups exist in areas where the state neglects them. For the long-term solution, the state should be able to provide justice to the people accordingly. Along with that, it must provide them with economic incentives and work on their human development. The problem of Islamic radicals started with Pakistan’s participation in the Afghan Jihad; from then onwards, the society was systematically radicalized to provide the fighter for Jihad; later, these jihadis laid the foundation of terrorist groups Pakistan has. Then Pakistan faced waves of terror attacks after Pakistan sided with the US war on terror efforts. To counter the menace of terrorism, Pakistan needs to de-radicalize and educate the masses. Before 1997, Pakistan had no Law related to terrorism, so the Government felt the need to enact anti-terror laws. In 1997, Pakistan enacted its first Anti-Terror Law, and with time, it was reformed, and new amendments were added.[34]
The primary criminal code of Pakistan is the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (PPC), which was modified to conform to Islamic principles. It is not, however, a comprehensive code for handling terrorist offenses. In order to prevent sectarian bloodshed, Pakistan also established special laws, such as the Special Courts Acts (1974–1997), which were approved prior to the Zia administration. Unfortunately, the ineffectiveness of these laws resulted in a rise in terrorist attacks and sectarian strife.
The Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 (ATA) was the first comprehensive law targeting terrorists, but its implementation proved difficult and complicated as it did not show effectiveness over time. Although one may argue that in order to prevent case backlogs, the ATA’s focus should be shifted from intercommunal conflicts to terrorism, this does not address Pakistan’s terrorist problem because of the multiple sources of crime and the regime’s original intent.[35]
Pakistan faces structural problems; these problems include political manipulation, lack of training, and inadequate responsive mechanisms in law enforcement agencies and judiciary, delaying the effectiveness of existing counter-terrorism strategies.[36] To address these issues, Pakistan needs to introduce structural reforms in the judiciary and law enforcement agencies to make it more effective and quick. Strengthening the management and coordination between the provincial and federal setup is a crucial task, as it can be achieved by strengthening the National Anti-Terrorist Act (NACTA).[37] Capacity building is also necessary due to the religious aspect of terrorist activities in Pakistan.
A special cadre of investigators should be established to strengthen the criminal procedure to avoid disparities and lacunas. A comprehensive plan to counter terrorism is needed, targeting both terrorist activities and the rising trend of radicalism. Pakistan should draft counterterrorism policies considering the size and scale of acts, duration of conflicts, means and methods of use, and deployment of resources.
Pakistan ought to consider the Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) of the United Kingdom and the Foreign Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) of the United States when formulating future policies. It should make policies according to these two policies, which have proven effective in these two countries.
To stop and prevent terrorist attacks, Pakistan should use contemporary methods for interception of communication and encourage and employ innovative prosecution techniques. Pakistan’s state policies in the security sector need reform due to changing security dynamics and should include non-kinetic measures to solve the problem of terrorism. As a developing state, Pakistan must create a people-focused conception of security and, work on its federal and provincial administrative balance, and build an environment of coordination among them.
Conclusion
The threat of ISKP is different in the sense that the fighters who constitute the group are educated; al Muhajir himself is said to be a graduate of Kabul University. The first place where the pamphlets for ISKP and spray paint on the wall were done was at Kabul University. Unlike TTP, whose core recruit is from Madrasah, the use of technology is very limited. There are reports that ISKP even has access to Pegasus spyware; it is said that they obtained this from drug cartels in South America who have access to such tools. For funding, they are using cryptocurrency, which shows how technologically up-to-date they are. When it comes to their propaganda, it is quite appealing; the evidence is visible that even people from Europe and some Western countries joined the group. When ISIS-Central was at its peak, a large number of educated men and even some European women went to Syria to participate in Jihad.[38] For this particular reason, the threat from the ISKP is formidable, as they can soon expand the state’s vulnerability and mobilize and establish themselves in Pakistan. Having said that, the threat level is currently medium. The group claims that they are in the reorganization and restructuring phase and that they will conduct covert terror attacks on random occasions. It might pose a threat in the future, so the state of Pakistan should take the necessary steps beforehand to eliminate this threat. The deradicalization process should be top-to-bottom, not bottom-up. The radical elements are prevalent in Pakistan, and Salafi takfiris are also in large numbers in Pakistan; they are the source for the group’s recruitment. These groups, because of their ambitious goals, like in the ISKP case creating the transnational Caliphate, become an ideal destination for youth who have seen the injustice done by the state and the current international political landscape. The ISKP has conducted terror attacks all across South Asia, and the most recent example of such an attack is in Russia.[39]
To counter ISKP, however, Pakistan security forces have also taken some steps. Pakistani security forces have implemented a multifaceted strategy to counter the activities of the Islamic State of Khurasan (ISKP). These measures include counterterrorism operations, increased vigilance, coordination with regional allies, targeted operations against ISKP’s strongholds and hideouts, and community engagement.[40] The main goal is to interfere with ISKP’s capacity to launch attacks and destroy its infrastructure. Security forces have increased their monitoring in areas where the ISKP is known to operate, aiming to identify and avert such assaults. They have also worked in tandem with regional allies to improve intelligence sharing and teamwork in the fight against terrorism. Targeted operations aim to demolish ISKP’s infrastructure and capture or kill important members. Community engagement is also essential to obtain information, foster trust, and stop radicalization. Overall, Pakistani security forces have employed a multifaceted approach to counter the ISKP’s activities within the nation.
[1] Who Is Islamic State – Khorasan Province?, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JU3MkL5-bKI.
[2] Jason Burke, “Who Is Thought to Be behind the Moscow Attack?,” The Observer, March 23, 2024, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/who-is-thought-to-be-behind-the-moscow-attack.
[3] Abid Hussain, “What Explains the Dramatic Rise in Armed Attacks in Pakistan?,” Al Jazeera, December 21, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/21/what-explains-the-dramatic-rise-in-armed-attacks-in-pakistan.
[4] “Kabul Airport Attack: What Do We Know?,” accessed June 19, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58349010.
[5] VOA Deewa Service, “Islamic State-Khorasan Criticizes Taliban in Statement Praising Russia Attackers,” Voice of America, March 25, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-khorasan-criticizes-taliban-in-statement-praising-russia-attackers-/7542235.html.
[6] Mohammad Yunus Yawar, Mushtaq Ali, and Y. P. Rajesh, “How ISIS-K Leader Forged One of Islamic State’s Most Fearsome Groups,” Reuters, March 26, 2024, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/leader-isis-group-linked-moscow-attack-has-global-ambitions-2024-03-25/.
[7] Kristina Hummel, “The Enduring Duel: Islamic State Khorasan’s Survival under Afghanistan’s New Rulers,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 30, 2023, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/.
[8] “Rational Choice – an Overview | ScienceDirect Topics,” accessed June 24, 2024, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/rational-choice.
[9] Maude Beaudry‐Cyr, “Rational Choice Theory,” in The Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment, ed. Wesley G. Jennings, 1st ed. (Wiley, 2015), 1–3, doi:10.1002/9781118519639.wbecpx038.
[10] Wayne Korbl, “Terrorism: Motivation and Theory,” The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology 9, no. 2 (August 30, 2017), doi:10.62915/2154-8935.1117.
[11] “ICCT Snapshot: Islamic State – Khorasan Province,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – ICCT, accessed April 30, 2024, https://www.icct.nl/publication/icct-snapshot-islamic-state-khorasan-province.
[12] Antonio Giustozzi, The Islamic State in Khorasan: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian Jihad (London: Hurst & Company, 2018).
[13] Ibid
[14] Ibid
[15] Ayesha Sikandar, “Assessing ISKP’s Expansion in Pakistan,” South Asian Voices, September 25, 2023, https://southasianvoices.org/iskr-expansion-in-pakistan/.
[16] Amina Khan, “Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan – An Assessment,” January 2019, https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/IP-No-39-Amina-Khan.pdf.
[17] Catrina Doxsee, “Examining Extremism: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) | Examining Extremism | CSIS,” September 8, 2021, https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-khorasan-province-iskp.
[18] Ibid.
[20] Giustozzi, The Islamic State in Khorasan. 90-120
[21] Ibid
[22] Yawar, Ali, and Rajesh, “How ISIS-K Leader Forged One of Islamic State’s Most Fearsome Groups.”
[23]Giustozzi, The Islamic State in Khorasan. 60-70
[24] Dante Schulz, “ISKP’s Propaganda Threatens Asia’s Security Apparatus • Stimson Center,” October 4, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/iskps-propaganda-threatens-asias-security-apparatus/.
[25] Rebecca Kheel, “Top US General: ISIS in Afghanistan Connected to Core Group,” Text, The Hill, (July 27, 2016), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/289445-top-us-general-isis-in-afghanistan-connected-to-core-group/.
[26] Abdul Sayed and Tore Refslund Hamming, “The Growing Threat of the Islamic State in Afghanistan and South Asia,” June 2023.
[27] Iain Overton, “Financing Terror: The Islamic State in the Khorasan Region,” AOAV, October 18, 2023, https://aoav.org.uk/2023/financing-terror-the-islamic-state-in-the-khorasan-region/.
[28] Ikram Junaidi, “Violence-Linked Fatalities Hit Six-Year High,” DAWN.COM, 06:47:30+05:00, https://www.dawn.com/news/1802262.
[29] “Dozens Dead after Pakistan Rocked by Bombings in Two Provinces | ISIL/ISIS News | Al Jazeera,” accessed June 18, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/29/isil-regional-branches-likely-behind-twin-blasts-in-pakistan-analysts.
[30] Alexander Palmer and Mackenzie Holtz, “The Islamic State Threat in Pakistan: Trends and Scenarios,” August 3, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/islamic-state-threat-pakistan-trends-and-scenarios.
[31] Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Turns Up Heat Over Cross-Border Attacks,” Voice of America, October 5, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-turns-up-heat-over-cross-border-attacks-/7298839.html.
[32] Kristina Hummel, “The Enduring Duel: Islamic State Khorasan’s Survival under Afghanistan’s New Rulers,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 30, 2023, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/.
[33] Abid Hussain, “Attacks in Pakistan Buttressed by Region’s ‘Militant’ Landscape: Analysts,” Al Jazeera, accessed April 30, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/2/attacks-in-pakistan-buttressed-by-regions-militant-landscape-analysts-say.
[34] Ayesha Jawad, “An Evaluation of Anti-Terrorism Laws in Pakistan: Lessons from the Past and Challenges for the Future,” Security and Defence Quarterly, February 26, 2022, doi:10.35467/sdq/144192.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan, US Discuss How to Counter Afghan-Based IS and TTP Terrorists,” Voice of America, May 13, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-us-discuss-how-to-counter-afghan-based-is-and-ttp-terrorists-/7609709.html.
[37] “Anti-Terrorism Laws in Pakistan – NACTA – National Counter Terrorism Authority NACTA Pakistan,” accessed June 24, 2024, https://nacta.gov.pk/laws-policies/anti-terrorism-laws-in-pakistan/.
[38] Anne Barnard, “Inside the Minds of the Women Who Joined ISIS,” The New York Times, September 10, 2019, sec. Books, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/books/review/guest-house-for-young-widows-azadeh-moaveni.html.
[39] “ISKP Goes Global: External Operations from Afghanistan | The Washington Institute,” accessed April 30, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iskp-goes-global-external-operations-afghanistan.
[40] Gul, “Pakistan, US Discuss How to Counter Afghan-Based IS and TTP Terrorists.”
Connect with Security Lense
Leave a Reply