Strategic Escalation between India, Pakistan, and the Role of China| Research Paper | Security Lense | 24-Oct-2025
The South Asian security dynamics are shaped by a Triangular deterrence strategy framework of Pakistan, India and China. One such case study that illustrates the intricate workings of this trilateral strategic balance is the “Four-Day Conflict” of May 2025, also referred to as the Pahalgam Crisis.
A group of terrorists opened fire on tourists in the Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir which set off the crisis, swiftly turning into a military conflict between India and Pakistan. The incident became even more complicated due to China’s long-standing strategic support for Pakistan.
This conflict crisis explicitly uncovered the uncertain nature of engagements between nuclear armed states, where the risk of escalation compels careful restraint and t demonstrates the critical role played by US in the crisis de escalation
Kashmir issue is the binding conflict between Pakistan and India since the end of British control in the region and it has further become more complex due to both countries acquisition of nuclear weapons in the late 20th century. China’s role and support for Pakistan has made the issue a Trilateral one, particularly through programs such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
An atmosphere of persistent animosity and profound mistrust has been increased by historical events, such as numerous wars and ongoing border standoffs, such as the 1962 India-China war and the 1965, 1971, and 1999 Kargil Wars between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the 1963 boundary agreement, wherein Pakistan transferred a part of Kashmir claimed by India to China, formally entrenched the three-way nature of the territorial dispute.[1]
Due to the constant confrontation between the three nuclear capable countries, it has created a threat of a potential nuclear war especially in the case of India ”two fronts” warfare against a Sino-Pak potential partnership. While China’s response to an India-Pakistan conflict or Pakistan’s response to an India-China border tensions tends to be more implicit than overt, Beijing’s growing military and logistical support to Islamabad, comprising approximately 60% of Pakistan’s weaponry, which positions China as a crucial, albeit not always direct, participant in any regional conflict.
The Pahalgam Conflict thus provides invaluable data on how modern militaries, equipped with globally sourced high technology platforms (including those from China, France, Israel, and Turkey), engage in combat under the setting of near-parity and amidst complex deterrence architectures.[2]
This essay will explore the theoretical foundations of triangle deterrence, assess the Pahalgam Crisis as a real world example of these dynamics, look at China’s complex role, and end with some thoughts on the implications for future conflict resolution and regional security.
Theoretical Framework
Understanding the dynamics of triangular deterrence involving India, Pakistan, and China during the Pahalgam Crisis requires drawing on established theories from international relations and security studies. Three key frameworks help explain the crisis: Barry Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), nuclear deterrence theory, and the concept of a strategic triangle or chain that defines the interconnected threats in South Asia.
1. Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)
Barry Buzan’s RSCT, developed in People, States and Fear, explains how security concerns are most intense and interdependent within specific regions. In such complexes, states’ national security problems are so interconnected that their security cannot be considered in isolation.
This is clearly applicable to South Asia. The India-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, now decades old, is not just a bilateral issue it has regional and global implications, especially since both countries are nuclear armed.
India sees China as a growing threat especially due to CPEC and how it gets closer to the Kashmir region inside Pakistan and the willingness and support of Pakistan. It’s already known to India and they see it as a growing threat and the effort to Internationalize the Kashmir Issue.
Regional Security Complex theory also highlights how actions by one state to enhance its security often decrease the security of others, creating a security dilemma.
This seems as an arm growing, mistrust and crisis which cannot be ignored in Asia. This presence of nuclear weapons creates a risk factor, as even a small conflict could with no intentions escalate into a catastrophic war, affecting not just the region but global security.
2. Deterrence Theory in the South Asian Context
The deterrence theory states that sometimes the effect of punishment makes the offender see that he is not being used for the benefit of others. As a crucial theory to understand the three dimensional deterrence of Pakistan India and China, It refers to the use of threats, usually of military retaliation, to stop countries from getting aggressive and decisive actions.
Pakistan’s Deterrence Posture
Pakistan follows the “full-spectrum deterrence” concept and possesses about 170 nuclear weapons. The following Framework reserves the right to use not conventional weapons but nuclear weapon as it does not have such policy like NFU( No First Use) Pakistan has armed itself with these tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), which it consider crucial for a credible deterrent even in the event of a limited or regional conflict, in response to India’s conventional military dominance.
Pakistan’s nuclear posture has strategic implications ahead of conventional deterrence. Under the belief that India’s military response is limited or constrained by the threat of nuclear retaliation. It is frequently argued that Pakistan’s strong nuclear capability permits it to employ asymmetric warfare tactics, such as the backing of proxy organizations functioning across the Line of Control (LoC).
This theory can be officially driven from the events during the Pahalgam crisis when Pakistan initiated or signaled a potential nuclear thought when the government officially invoked National Command Authority (NCA) meeting amidst the crisis. This signaling created a potential concern across the globe of the escalation although it was understood later on the reason and purpose of the meeting.
India’s Evolving Deterrence Strategy
According to the official records, India has 164 Warheads and they have an official no first use policy. However, the relevance of this stance has come under doubts and scrutiny, specifically following the events of 2019.
The Pahalgam incident was a very important event for the Indian nuclear stance, initiating “Operation Sindoor” during this 2025 episode, changing the old approach to a new one of “deterrence with consequence.”
In reaction to attacks backed by Pakistan, this policy calls for carrying out targeted reprisal strikes with the goal of avoiding both military and civilian losses in order to prevent a full scale escalation.
Indian approach is destabilizing Pakistan’s approach of nuclear threat while using their proxy warfare across the border. In the approach of Thomas Schelling’s theory that deterrence is only effective when it demonstrates “the power to hurt,” India’s specific military actions exemplify a strategy of controlled force, asserting resolve while avoiding steps that could lead to nuclear confrontation.
There were no explicit threats during the crisis and no country officially claimed of a nuclear usage possibility, the specter of nuclear weapons persisted in influencing choices.
The case demonstrated how escalation can be prevented with selective deterrence and smart crisis management. It did, however, also draw attention to the grave risk of making a mistake in situations with rapidly evolving conflicts.
Strategic Triangle and “Strategic Chain” Dynamics
South Asia’s security cannot be viewed through a simple India-Pakistan lens. Instead, it functions within a strategic triangle involving China and is influenced by external powers like the United States. This broader view is often referred to as a “strategic chain” where each state’s decisions affect and are influenced by others, both regionally and globally.[3]
Power Asymmetries and Interlinked Threats
The region’s security dynamics are shaped by power imbalances:
- Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons and Chinese support to offset India’s conventional superiority.
- India, in turn, sees itself as vulnerable to Chinese strategic pressure, especially along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
This results in what Indian analysts call a “two-front war” scenario the possibility of simultaneous conflict with Pakistan and China.
The China-Pakistan alliance, though not a formal military pact, is strategically deep. China is Pakistan’s largest arms supplier and plays a key role in its surveillance, logistics, and defense systems.
China’s Role in the Triangle
China’s support for Pakistan goes beyond military assistance. Through CPEC, it has economic stakes in disputed regions, further aligning its interests with Pakistan and increasing Indian apprehensions. While China avoided direct involvement in the Pahalgam Crisis, its systems and platforms were used by Pakistan in military operations, showing its embedded influence.
China’s presence makes the region’s deterrence more complex and unstable. Even if China doesn’t intend to fight alongside Pakistan, its support emboldens Islamabad and may provoke stronger Indian countermeasures, escalating tensions along both borders.
The Role of the United States
The U.S. plays a pivotal external role in this triangle. Washington’s strategic partnership with India centered on shared concerns about China has grown significantly. At the same time, U.S. pressure and mediation were essential in de-escalating the Pahalgam Crisis, especially in its final hours.
However, this strategic realignment raises new frictions. China sees the Indo-U.S. alliance as a threat to its regional dominance, and Pakistan views it as a disruption of South Asia’s power balance. The U.S. also supports India’s bid for membership in global regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which China opposes.[5] These global power dynamics directly shape regional deterrence behavior.
The Pahalgam Crisis: A Case Study in Triangular Deterrence
The Pahalgam Crisis of April–May 2025, also called the Four-Day Conflict, marked the most serious India–Pakistan military standoff in decades and provided a revealing case of triangular deterrence involving China. The crisis escalated rapidly, crossing new thresholds in both geographical reach and types of weaponry used, before being contained through intense U.S.-led diplomatic engagement.[6]
Crisis Genesis and India’s Initial Response
The immediate trigger was a terrorist attack on April 22 in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, which killed 26 Hindu tourists. The communal nature of the attack and its civilian toll made military retaliation almost inevitable, echoing previous Indian responses to Uri (2016) and Pulwama (2019). Although direct evidence linking The Resistance Front to Pakistan was limited, India’s attribution was widely accepted internationally, given Pakistan’s history of supporting cross-border militancy.
India initially employed diplomatic and economic pressure, most notably placing the Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance” on April 23. Pakistan’s sharp response, calling any water diversion an “act of war”, highlighted the weaponization of hydro-politics as part of India’s coercive diplomacy, signaling that long-standing agreements would no longer be immune from worsening security dynamics.
On May 7, India launched “Operation Sindoor”, a series of punitive air and drone strikes across nine sites in Pakistan. Five were in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and four in Punjab, including deep strikes on Muridke and Bahawalpur targets not hit since the 1971 war. The use of SCALP-EG cruise missiles, HAMMER bombs, and BrahMos missiles demonstrated significant technological escalation.
India declared the strikes a “strategic coercive signal”, aimed not at degrading terrorist capacity directly but at ending the notion of “safe zones” within Pakistan.[7] Indian forces avoided military targets, labeling their approach “measured and non-escalatory”, though Pakistan reported 40 civilian deaths, casting doubt on India’s claim of eliminating “over 100 terrorists.” Many suspect that Pakistan had preemptively evacuated these sites.
Pakistan’s Retaliation and Chinese Military Support
Following India’s May 7 airstrikes, Pakistan claimed swift success in a defensive counter-air operation, asserting it had shot down six Indian Air Force (IAF) jets, including Rafale and Mirage-2000 aircraft. While the full extent remains disputed, independent investigations including from The Washington Post and Reuters confirmed at least three crash sites, supporting Pakistan’s claims to some extent. No aircraft from either side reportedly crossed borders, implying that Indian aircraft were downed within Indian territory.
A critical factor in Pakistan’s performance was its use of modern Chinese military systems. U.S. intelligence confirmed that J-10C fighters using PL-15 air-to-air missiles were involved. Indian reports also noted missile debris consistent with PL-15s. Additionally, retired Indian defense officials speculated that China-supplied HQ-9 air defense systems may have been responsible for aircraft losses.
Pakistan emphasized the effective integration of Chinese platforms, facilitated by years of military cooperation. Officials portrayed the engagement as a symbolic contest where “Chinese-made machines” shattered India’s perceived air superiority post-Rafale acquisition.
Pakistan’s Air Chief credited Chinese satellite communication and surveillance systems with enhancing detection and interception capabilities, even alleging Pakistani aircraft intercepted Indian Rafale comms. Showing Pakistan’s PL-15s failures as India denied any claim of successful targets by Pakistan
Between May 7–10, Pakistan respond with launching of drones and missiles claiming targeting key installations. While initially denied by Pakistani officials, evidence confirmed sustained Pakistani drone activity, reportedly probing Indian air defenses. India claimed these low-grade attacks caused minimal damage, with air defense systems responding effectively.
In retaliation, India struck Pakistani air defense sites using Israeli-origin Harpy and Harop drones, especially around Lahore. Pakistan admitted to injuries and partial radar damage, suggesting some success in India’s counterstrikes. Despite this, Pakistan publicly framed the attacks as fresh aggression, prompting elite criticism of the government’s slower response posture.
The crisis escalated further on May 9–10, as Pakistan deployed Yiha-III kamikaze drones and Fatah-I/Fatah-II SRBMs. While Pakistan claimed extensive damage across 15 Indian airbases, India acknowledged only minor damage at four locations.
India’s S-400 defense system reportedly played a role, but Pakistani claims of destroying any of its components remain unverified. India credited its integrated anti-drone systems with limiting damage, reflecting tactical learning from global conflicts.
Escalation Dynamics and Nuclear Shadow
The Kashmir region remained a central theater during the Pahalgam Crisis. The 2021 ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) collapsed following India’s air, drone, and artillery strikes. Over the remaining days of the conflict, both sides engaged in intense exchanges of small arms, mortars, and artillery, with occasional use of tanks and anti-tank guided missiles. Though neither side attempted to alter LoC positions, civilian casualties in nearby villages were significant, echoing patterns from past Indo-Pak hostilities. Outside Kashmir, the conflict evolved into an air, drone, and missile standoff.[8]
India’s synchronized strikes on at least eleven Pakistani military targets, including airbases (Nur Khan, Rafiqui, Sukkur, Sarghoda, etc.), command centers, and air defense sites, marked the height of the crisis on the evening of May 9–10.
These assaults, which Indian authorities characterized as “calibrated and targeted,” were meant as payback for ongoing drone strikes by Pakistan. Satellite imagery confirmed runway cratering and damage to large hangars at several sites, though no conclusive evidence emerged of aircraft destruction. Analyst Jeffrey Lewis noted that bases were damaged but not incapacitated.
One controversial claim during this phase was that India targeted a nuclear storage site in Kirana Hills, near Sargodha. Although India’s Air Force denied this, speculation persisted due to the proximity of strikes near Chaklala cantonment, which houses Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division. While India likely avoided nuclear-related infrastructure intentionally, some interpreted this as India “knocking on the nuclear door.”
India’s operational success on May 9–10 was credited to the use of decoy drones, anti-radiation UAVs, and long-range standoff weapons such as BrahMos, SCALP, Crystal Maze, and Rampage missiles, overcoming Pakistani defenses more effectively than on May 7.
Throughout the conflict, nuclear deterrence heavily shaped decision-making. India’s “No First Use” policy and Pakistan’s tactical nuclear strategy loomed over each escalation. The potential for a “nuclear winter” in the event of full-scale war remains a grave concern. Pakistan’s brief announcement of a National Command Authority meeting on May 10 triggered immediate U.S. concern as a nuclear signaling was subdued. Still, both countries showed restraint and an ability to manage escalation, even amid deep mistrust and high-intensity conflict.
International Mediation and De-escalation
US brokered a truce between the two countries showing US role in potential de-escalation between nuclear armed countries. Vice President J.D. Vance declared, “We’re not going to get involved in the middle of a war that’s fundamentally none of our business,” indicating the United States’ initial non-interventionist posture. However this stance was seen shifting after an intelligence signaling of the further escalation of the crisis
United States Vice President called on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi alarming him about a possible escalation if certain steps are not taken. As the issue approached its climax, Secretary of State Marco Rubio had already increased efforts and maintained constant communication with regional actors. In a crucial moment, Rubio directly spoke with Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen. Asim Munir, which is seen as the head of the affairs of Pakistan offering U.S. support for future negotiations at a neutral site, a significant goodwill concession for Pakistan, which has long sought third-party mediation, in contrast to India’s preference for bilateral diplomacy.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s announcement of a National Command Authority meeting on May 10 signaled possible nuclear readiness, but the declaration was abruptly retracted, likely influenced by the Rubio-Munir call. This turn of event shows Pakistan’s willingness to de-escalate following the international pressure.
Attempts to communicate directly with the military also resumed at this time. Although India took a while to respond, the Pakistani DGMO did get in touch with his Indian counterpart. India consented to communicate after Rubio called Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, but insisted that all terms be handled by military means. A formal ceasefire arrangement was reached by 3:30 PM after a brief DGMO discussion at 1:15 PM (New Delhi time).
At 7:55 AM U.S. Eastern time, President Donald Trump publicly announced a “Full and Immediate Ceasfire,” mediated by the U.S. Secretary Rubio later added that both parties had agreed to future talks. However, India swiftly denied consenting to international negotiations, reiterating its position on bilateralism. This discrepancy revealed the limits of external mediation, even in crisis prevention.
Despite posturing and tensions, the deal held because of growing pressure, fear of escalation, and diplomatic efforts, demonstrating that both India and Pakistan ultimately aimed to prevent additional conflict.
Post-Crisis Deterrence Architecture
A “fragile pause” in the long running Pak-India conflict do not appear as seen of them going to a potential truce of peace. A “new deterrence architecture” is emerging as a result of India’s crisis response, especially “Operation Sindoor,” This new strategy, which aims to go beyond business as usual, is typified by “deterrence with consequence” and “restraint with readiness.” The core message from India is that the nuclear threshold is no longer an “inviolable wall” behind which Pakistan can safely foster proxy actors; instead, it is a “calculated boundary”. India has transitioned from “strategic patience to strategic signaling,” demonstrating a calm, deliberate, and action-backed resolve. The development of “a limited, precise, and proportionate toolkit to neutralise threats without triggering wider conflict” puts Pakistan’s traditional calculus under pressure. The strikes were executed with “tactical precision, minimal collateral damage, and complete control over escalation,” making it clear that India’s target is not the Pakistani populace but the terrorist syndicates operating under state patronage.
The strategic use of hydro-politics, exemplified by placing the Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance,” further underscores India’s new stance that “foundational agreements cannot remain insulated amid a worsening security environment”. This signals that if terrorism continues, water flows might not. India’s articulated “No-tolerance policy on terrorism” signifies an end to accepting ceasefires merely as routine de-escalation tools, only to face renewed provocations. This ceasefire, therefore, is not a basis for immediate dialogue on broader issues but rather a demand for accountability.
Pakistan seems to have taken more responsibility and without even questioning. Pakistan has little possibility due to its severe economic collapse, internal political unrest, and growing isolation from the rest of the world. A “fundamental break from its old strategy of sponsoring jihadist proxies” is what India is hoping for. It is implied by the new deterrence architecture that “calibrated, perhaps even escalatory, consequences” will be applied to any future violations. “The space for ambiguity has shrunk,” indicating that the “era of strategic inertia is over”. India has developed a mature security policy that asserts its choice of when and how it engages, balancing capability with clarity, retaliation with standards, and preparedness with prudence.
The crisis provided a baseline for future India-Pakistan crises, emphasizing the need to scrutinize its lessons for defense acquisitions and doctrinal innovation, as the pace of military technological change means future conflicts might be meaningfully different. India’s military actions and PM Modi’s firm tone convey that while peace remains a preferred goal, it will not come at the cost of principle.
China’s Enduring Role in the Triangular Dynamic
Chinese role in the affairs seems strategic often called as the South Asian deterrence. Beijing’s relationship with Islamabad, characterized as an “ironclad strategic partnership,” plays a significant role in shaping India’s security calculations and the overall regional military dynamic.
Historical Context and Strategic Alignment
The origins of the China-Pakistan strategic partnership date back to the early Cold War era, solidifying after the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War and the 1965 India-Pakistan War. In 1965, feeling deceived by what was viewed as a lack of U.S. backing, Pakistan looked to fortify ties with China.
Given the U.S.’s readiness to support India in its fight against communist China, China, on the other hand, saw it wise to side with Pakistan. China’s “psychological assault” against India and tacit assistance for Pakistan produced a “two-front pressure scenario” for India, influencing its military strategy for decades even if it did not actively intervene militarily in 1965 or 1971.
The 1972 Sino-U.S. rapprochement further saw the U.S. tilt towards Pakistan, even overlooking China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program in pursuit of Cold War objectives. This history has cemented Pakistan as China’s “most steadfast ally” in India’s neighborhood. For China, Pakistan serves as a “counterweight” to India, while for Pakistan, China represents the “ultimate insurance policy”.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
CPEC, a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has significantly altered the Kashmir conflict’s dynamics. The corridor’s route traverses disputed territory, including Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. This directly alarms India, which views such development as a violation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. From India’s perspective, China’s presence in these areas supports Pakistan’s territorial ambitions and exacerbates existing geopolitical tensions, effectively “internationalizing” the Kashmir conflict by drawing in a major global power. CPEC is seen as part of China’s increasing influence in India’s “maritime and continental neighborhood,” contributing to India’s perception of “encirclement”.[10]
Military and Logistical Support
China is deeply embedded in Pakistan’s military, serving as a primary supplier of advanced weaponry. Approximately 60% of Pakistan’s arsenal today is Chinese-made, forming the core of its military strength. This includes JF-17 Thunder and J-10C fighter jets, HQ-9 air defense systems (similar to India’s S-400), Barber-class frigates, Hangar-class submarines, and AL Khaled T-4 tanks. During the Pahalgam Crisis, Pakistan’s effective defensive counter-air operations reportedly utilized Chinese J-10C aircraft and PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, achieving some success against modern Indian Rafale jets. Pakistan found the integration of these Chinese platforms remarkably easy due to decades of hardware and logistical cooperation. Beyond hardware, Chinese surveillance, satellite communication, and satellite support aided Pakistani air force in identifying targets and intercepting Indian Rafale communications, which Pakistan claimed “shattered the notion of Indian air superiority”. This clearly demonstrates that China, while not directly intervening with troops, is far from a neutral party in an India-Pakistan conflict.
China’s Evolving Stance on Kashmir and Regional Issues
While China has historically expressed sympathy for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, its backing for Pakistan’s efforts to internationalize the conflict has reportedly “waned over the last two decades”. For instance, during the 1999 Kargil conflict, China publicly called for restraint and privately urged Pakistani leadership to pull back. However, China’s actions, such as repeatedly blocking India’s attempts to list Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist at the UN Security Council, still demonstrate Beijing’s shielding of “strategic assets of the Pakistan army”. This changed only after sustained pressure from the U.S. and France.
China prioritizes its own strategic development which is a “well-synchronized internal and external policy” and an “aversion to embarking on military ventures”. China maintains a “minimum deterrence” nuclear strategy with a “no-first-use” policy and is not in the same category of nuclear armaments as the U.S. or Russia. A nuclear conflict between India and China is considered unlikely.
However, India’s deepening military partnership with the United States, its membership in the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), and participation in initiatives like the Malabar exercises and South China Sea patrols are viewed by China as “inimical to its core interests” and as part of a U.S. containment strategy.
China reacted to India’s aggressive infrastructure development in eastern Ladakh in Spring 2020, leading to skirmishes on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), also in response to India’s 2019 actions in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Chinese strategy of deploying forces on LAC (Line of Actual Control) gives Indian strategists a blow forcing them to divide soldiers for a two fronts warfare.
In this way, China’s role in the triangular deterrence is multifaceted, providing critical military and strategic support to Pakistan, creating complications for India’s security calculus; its economic initiatives like CPEC have geopolitical ramifications in disputed territories; and its strategic competition with the U.S. draws India closer to Washington, further intensifying the regional security dilemma.
The broad mistrust and zero-sum perceptions among the three powers ensure that conflict, or the potential for it, remains a regular phenomenon in South Asia.
Conclusion and Future Outlook
The nature of events of Triangular deterrence was brought to light during the Pahalgam crisis in May 2025. When a terrorist attack created panic between the two countries directly escalating the situation and going to even nuclear weapons possibility.
India made a conceptual shift toward “deterrence with consequence” with its precision retaliation operation, “Operation Sindoor,” which was deliberately trying to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear-ambiguity-protected proxy strategy.
Pakistan’s response with J10-C and PL-15 Missiles creating an international perception and Chinese possible integration into Pakistan’s military infrastructure. While China remained formally uninvolved, its logistical, surveillance, and diplomatic support made it an influential actor.
India’s strategic concern over a possible two-front war, involving simultaneous pressure from Pakistan and China, remains a central consideration in its evolving defense posture.
The conflict exposes how nuclear deterrence can be both stabilizing and limiting. Nuclear signals were restrained by both sides, indicating a level of crisis management maturity.
Although, the increasing threats posed by new military technologies were highlighted by the rise in drone warfare and missile exchanges. Although post-crisis disputes demonstrated the limitations of external intervention, international mediation, especially from the United States, proved crucial in enabling a truce.
Indian strategic and deterrence posture gave Pakistan a befitting response of no more support for the jihadist moments in the Kashmir region especially. The Kashmir conflict, however, remains unresolved and continues to fuel periodic escalations. Despite Pakistan’s stated pivot toward a “geo-economic” vision and calls for peace, India’s nationalist stance and security imperatives have so far precluded diplomatic breakthroughs.
Strong crisis protocols, Track to diplomacy, and organized discourse are necessary for lasting peace. Informal interaction and mutual constraint may lessen the likelihood of miscalculations even while formal trilateral collaboration is still far off. In the end, the Pahalgam Crisis confirmed that while war may be prevented in this trilateral dynamic, crises will continue to be a persistent problem needing ongoing attention to detail, diplomacy, and strategic planning.
References
[1] “India, Pakistan and the Fight for Kashmir,” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2025, accessed June 17, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2025/5/12/india-pakistan-and-the-fight-for-kashmir.
[2] Huraira Nawaz Cheema, “Threads of Influence: Reframing the 2025 Indo‑Pak Confrontation As a Proxy Showcase of U.S. and Chinese Strategic Doctrines,” Review Journal of Social Psychology & Social Works 3, no. 2 (2025): 1041–49, accessed June 17, 2025, https://www.socialworksreview.com/index.php/Journal/article/view/262. socialworksreview.com
[3] Salman Bashir, “The China–India–Pakistan Nuclear Triangle: Consequential Choices for Asian Security,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 5, no. 2 (2022): 336–49, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2141053.
[4] Imtiaz Gul, Interview on Regional Security and the Indo-Pak Crisis, YouTube video, 18:34, posted by DAWN NEWS, 2025, https://youtu.be/9V7P-xkvP14?si=8GIzsUr8AN5ZZ-ng.
[5] Huraira Nawaz Cheema, “Threads of Influence: Reframing the 2025 Indo‑Pak Confrontation As a Proxy Showcase of U.S. and Chinese Strategic Doctrines,” Review Journal of Social Psychology & Social Works 3, no. 2 (2025): 1041–49, accessed June 17, 2025, https://www.socialworksreview.com/index.php/Journal/article/view/262. socialworksreview.com
[6] Ihsan Muhammad “Border Dispute & the Triangular Conflict Between China, India, Pakistan,” Kashmir Institute of International Relations, accessed June 17, 2025, https://www.kiir.org.pk/blogs/border-dispute-the-triangular-conflict-between-china‑india‑pakistan‑2668.
[7] Manish Dabhade and Tarun Agarwal, “India‑Pakistan Ceasefire: A New Deterrence Architecture Takes Shape,” Expert Speak (Observer Research Foundation), May 21, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-pakistan-ceasefire-a-new-deterrence-architecture-takes-shape. orfonline.org+9orfonline.org+9orfonline.org+9
[8] Arun Swamy, “India–Pakistan Conflict Tests the Limits of Nuclear Deterrence,” East Asia Forum, May 27, 2025, accessed June 17, 2025, https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/05/27/india-pakistan-conflict-tests-the-limits-of-nuclear-deterrence/. washingtonpost.com+7eastasiaforum.org+7x.com+7
[9] Monish Tourangbam, “The China‑India‑Pakistan Triangle: Origins, Contemporary Perceptions, and Future,” Stimson Center, June 25, 2020, accessed June 17, 2025, https://www.stimson.org/2020/the-china-india-pakistan-triangle-origins-contemporary-perceptions-and-future/. stimson.org+9stimson.org+9ojs.mul.edu.pk+9
[10] The India–China–Pakistan Triangle Shapes South Asia’s Military Dynamics, with China Backing Pakistan Against India, YouTube video, published May 2025 (approx.), duration unknown, https://www.youtube.com/watch?si=-aDtFwIvtQbZp-im&v=66k_8zWc6sg&feature=youtu.be. youtube.com
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