The Gaza war is not just the one that has caused destruction and grief, but has also redefined the political boundaries in the Middle East. This region has been a theatre of proxy wars during decades, Saudi Arabia and Iran fighting in the form of militias, Israel using American protection, and Turkey and Qatar as middle actors. But the post-Gaza reality has led to a very grave question: is the Middle East gradually abandoning proxy politics and trying itself in direct diplomacy instead?
This change was even preceded by the war. The Saudi-Iran rapprochement that was mediated by China in 2023 would have been inconceivable several years ago as both giants were getting dirty with blood in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. Gaza accelerated this trend. Riyadh, which used to be wary of Palestine, has been forced to re-calibrate. It cannot afford to be perceived as giving the
Palestinian cause the cold shoulder particularly with its domestic legitimacy largely based on Islamic leadership. In commemorating the resistance of Hamas, Iran also appears to like a gradual involvement as opposed to an open-ended escalation that may entangle the U.S. further into the confrontation. That is, the old regional adversaries were all at once on the same page, though not necessarily on the same line, regarding Gaza.
The loss of centrality to the American is what is different about this moment. Washington is still the protector of Israel but its credibility in the wider Middle East has been badly stunned. In the Arab streets and in the palaces of the Gulf, the understanding is obvious: the U.S cannot work as an unbiased mediator. This vacuum is murmuring with new players entering the game, both China as a negotiator of propositions, Russia as a would-be substitute partner, particularly with discussions such as the Astana process on Syria. The states in the region are not neatly falling into blocs like during the Cold War, though. They are trying various alliances, gambling against relying on any of the power.
The Gaza war too revealed the boundaries of proxy politics. The measured reaction of Hezbollah in Lebanon indicated that Iran is no longer keen on dragging its allies to the open war front. In Yemen, the Houthis launched missiles but these attacks appeared to be symbolic rather than strategic. This was an eye opening experience to the common people in the region: proxies might scream, but they are not making the battlefield any better. States, on the contrary, lose more, the oil incomes, the trade ways, the investment. And the fact that Gulf capitals now are talking more of regional stability than of permanent resistance is no coincidence.
Naturally, diplomacy is not becoming overnight clean and idealistic in the Middle East. The interests are still tough and survival instinct. The difference is that states are realizing the price of allowing proxy wars to take over their agendas. Syria is in ruins, Yemen is a humanitarian tragedy, the economy of Lebanon is stamped on. Since Gaza, most Arab leaders believe that another decade of proxy wars would be dangerous to tear up their societies beyond salvage. Harmful as they may be, direct negotiations cost less than long-lasting wars of militias.
This realignment is fragile. Israel, however, will never change its basic policy, and without a fair settlement to Palestinians, no regional politics will be considered a legitimate policy. Meanwhile, the United States can attempt to reestablish itself by redoubling efforts on military alliances rather than accommodate multipolar diplomacy. Iran and Saudi Arabia can go back to hostility should domestic calculations shift. And smaller players, such as Turkey, Qatar and the UAE might remain straddling between mediation and competition.
However despite these dangers, the Gaza war has demonstrated something that has been a long time secret, that proxy wars are no longer beneficial to the region as they used to be. It is possible to see the costs, and the gains are hard to predict, and the new global order provides less space to endless conflicts. Diplomacy can never fix all but nowadays, in decades it is not an evidence of weaknesses but of survival.
Middle East has crossed the crossroads. Its states will be in the future either the ransom of militia politics and foreign sponsors, or they will at last adopt the painful way of direct negotiation. Gaza has put it clear that the ancient ways are not sustainable. It will not be the foreign powers that will determine whether the new ways will work, but the strength of the leaders of the region themselves.
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