Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty | Explainer | Security Lense | 09-Dec-2024
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968, is an agreement aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, encouraging disarmament, and promoting the peaceful use of energy. The Non-Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty based on three main pillars; peaceful use of nuclear technology, disarmament, and non-proliferation seeks to maintain a balance between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. However, history reveals that the treaty struggles and faces several challenges to fulfill its objectives. These challenges raise legitimate concerns about the security of non-nuclear weapon states, disturbing the global nuclear order. The weakness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty structure combined with geopolitical and strategical rivalries, emphasizes its ineffectiveness.
The asymmetry in obligations caused between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states is one of the fundamental weaknesses of this treaty. The treaty recognizes states that acquired nuclear weapons before 1967 as nuclear weapon states. This includes the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, and Russia. Article VI of the treaty obligates these states to pursue disarmament to end the nuclear arms race. However, the NPT does not provide a clear timeline or mechanisms to promote disarmament, and nuclear weapon states instead modernize their nuclear arsenals, undermining the credibility of the treaty.
In contrast, Article 2 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is more concerned with non-nuclear weapon states. According to this article, non-nuclear weapons states are forbidden from acquiring or developing nuclear arsenals. In addition, under the article, these states will face inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This creates inequality between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, as one is constrained by strict non-proliferation efforts and the other does not face any pressure for disarmament. This imbalance raises the question of its incapability while addressing security concerns.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to some extent has been effective in preventing the global horizontal proliferation, especially after the Cold War era. However, it poses some implications, selective enforcement and political bias raise the question of the success of the treaty. For instance, states like North Korea and Iraq faced significant sanctions, on the other hand, Israel, India, and Pakistan developed their nuclear arsenals without being members of the treaty. This undermines the universality of the treaty and encourages questions from the non-nuclear weapon states regarding their security concerns, and whether their security is enhanced or compromised.
Moreover, Article 10 argues for the withdrawal of the states from NPT if their supreme interest is compromised. For instance, the article practiced by North Korea poses significant concerns and critical loopholes. States can develop their nuclear weapons by claiming it for peaceful purposes, exploiting the NPT. This is a challenge to the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty heightening the insecurity of non-nuclear weapon states.
Disarmament, the second pillar of NPT remained the most dazzling failure of the whole treaty. Even with the end of the Cold war and several bilateral arms control agreements, global nuclear arsenals are rapidly modernizing. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, it has been estimated that 13,000 nuclear warheads have been modernized under several programs by the United States, Russia, and China.
The strong reliance on nuclear arsenals, nuclear deterrence, and the absence of measures taken toward disarmament fuel tensions among non-nuclear weapon states. The failure of Article V represents nuclear weapons as an instrument of power and prestige. This incentive led non-nuclear weapon states to reconsider their status as non-nuclear states. This undermines the treaty’s long-term efficiency and credibility.
The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty according to Article 6 it gives access to the non-nuclear weapon states for the peaceful use of nuclear technology. This happened to maintain balance on the treaty’s restrictive measures of the NPT for nuclear weapon states, and non-nuclear weapon states. However, the implementation of this pillar has been spoiled due to political interference, and discriminatory practices etc.
For example, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) firm conditions on nuclear transfer are influenced by geopolitical considerations. The non-nuclear weapon states, that seek to develop nuclear weapons or pose technological capabilities to enrich Uranium faces scrutiny. Iran and Brazil illustrate the challenges that are faced by the non-nuclear weapon states while contending their rights under Article 4. This erodes the trust and creates a sense of inequality in the NPT framework among non-nuclear weapon states.
This inability and ineffectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty address the raising security concerns of non-nuclear weapon states. This is a central critique of its efficiency. Many states gave up on their nuclear arsenals and signed the treaty, believing that they will be protected through disarmament and strong international order. Nevertheless, the NPT’s failure causes regional instability, a threat to nuclear weapons, and raising security concerns for Non-nuclear weapon states.
The non-nuclear weapons states in labile regions such as the Middle East, experience significant threats from the nuclear-armed neighbors and states under the extended deterrence commitments. The lack of efforts to make the Middle East, a nuclear weapon-free zone highlights the treaty’s inability to convey the challenges faced to maintain regional stability. Similarly, the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces escalated global insecurity, influencing the nuclear non-weapon states.
Reforming the NPT to address its inherent weaknesses is essential for restoring trust and legitimacy. This includes establishing clear and enforceable timelines for disarmament, strengthening the universality of the treaty, and ensuring equitable access to peaceful nuclear technology. Additionally, greater efforts are needed to address regional security concerns and promote confidence-building measures among states.
The NPT, as a critical pillar of the non-proliferation regime has failed to deliver its promises. The ineffectiveness of NPT raised serious concerns about the security of the non-nuclear weapon states and the fairness of international order.
This ineffectiveness give rise to the need of alternative frameworks to achieve global security. To address these challenges, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, was signed in 2017 with the aim to address the concerns of nuclear non-weapon states. However, it does not involve the participation of the members of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and key non-nuclear weapon states, limiting its impact.
To address these challenges and raise security concerns of both the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapons states respectively, a renewed commitment of both states is required. Additionally, great efforts are required to promote confidence-building measures among these states. Without these efforts, NPT risks becoming a symbol of division rather than a method/tool promoting collective security.
Connect with Security Lense
Leave a Reply